When Substance-over-Form Argument is Available to the Taxpayer by Donaldson, J. Bruce
Marquette Law Review
Volume 48
Issue 1 Summer 1964 Article 4
When Substance-over-Form Argument is Available
to the Taxpayer
J. Bruce Donaldson
Attorney
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
J. Bruce Donaldson, When Substance-over-Form Argument is Available to the Taxpayer, 48 Marq. L. Rev. (1964).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol48/iss1/4
WHEN SUBSTANCE-OVER-FORM
ARGUMENT IS AVAILABLE
TO THE TAXPAYER*
J. BRUCE DONALDSON**
The gospel that the substance of a transaction, rather than mere
form, controls the tax incidents is accepted by all. Substantial diver-
gence exists, however, as to the full meaning of this doctrine, the ap-
propriate scope of its application, and its effect upon particularized tax
situations.
At least three levels of meaning exist:
1. The income tax is designed to mesh with, and interfere the least
in, the operation of American enterprise. It is not a sweeping, even-
handed, across-the-top, gross income tax. Rather, its structure spans
the entire breadth of the economy, classifies by legal type all economic
transactions, and imposes upon each classified type certain tax incidents
and burdens. The Internal Revenue Code, taken as a whole, represents a
composite of congressional policy as to the spreading, impact, and weight-
ing of the total tax burden over the entire cross section of the economy.
In order for such a system to correctly function, the incident of taxation
must be made to depend upon the economic substance of the transaction.
To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere for-
malisms which exist solely to alter tax liabilities would seriously impair
the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress. In this
sense and context, the doctrine of substance-over-form serves a high
'purpose. It is a search for the essential reality, seeking to uncover the
economic substance in order to allow the tax burden to fall with the
exact weight which Congress intended.
2. The phrase "substance-over-form" is a label. Like most labels, it
is frequently not the determining reason for the tax result, but instead
is pasted on the fact situation afterward as a shorthand description of
the conclusion. The competitive generalization-that a taxpayer is en-
titled under the law to so order his affairs as to incur the least tax-is
likewise an over-simplification. Generalizations are blunt tools in at-
tempting to uncover essential essence in particularized factual transac-
tions. To the extent these labels are used as substitutes for painstaking
* This article is based on a lecture given at the Fourteenth Annual Marquette
University Institute on Taxation.
**L.L.B., University of Detroit; L.L.M., New York University; attorney,
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analysis, each is an impediment and not an aiding hand in the task of
reaching results based on substance.
3. A considerable body of thought exists that the doctrine of sub-
stance is a sword available to the Commissioner, but that it may not
be used as a shield by the taxpayer. The rationalization supporting this
view is that, since the taxpayer is originally free to choose the form,
the Commissioner may appropriately be heard to say that the form does
not comport with substance, but the taxpayer may not be heard
to deny on hindsight the freely chosen form. While this homely bit
of supposed wisdom has much present currency, it is not wholly ac-
curate as a matter of over-all case analysis.
It is the purpose and task of this article to demonstrate that the
substance-over-form argument is available to the taxpayer in an ex-
panding number of situations and with increasing and encouraging
success. First, we will turn briefly to the origin and development of
the substance doctrine and touch upon its current scope. Second, we
shall consider a cross section or sampling of areas in which, under
present case precedent, the substance argument is available to the tax-
payers.
1. SUBSTANCE V. FORM: ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND SCOPE
OF THE DOCTRINE.
The earliest clear articulation of the substance doctrine traces back
to the Supreme Court's opinion in Weiss v. Stearn' in which the Court
stated:
Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was
actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the parti-
cipants .... [W] hen applying. . , income tax laws . . . we must
regard matters of substance and not mere form.2
From this firm beginning, we find that all of the principal mile-
stones in development, expansion and interweaving of the substance
doctrine into the fabric of tax law are represented by Supreme Court
decisions. The case names are familiar to all-Gregory v. Helvering,3
Higgins v. Smith,4 Conmissioner v. Court Holding,5 and many more.
While some development has occurred at the lower court level, never-
theless, each new and bold step in the expansion of the primacy of
substance is represented by a trail-blazing Supreme Court decision.
Although these case names ring memory bells for all, it may be
well to sharpen our recollection briefly, since these decisions exert such
pervading influence upon and foundation the whole doctrine of sub-
stance-over-form.
1265 U.S. 242 (1924).
2 Id. at 254.
3 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
4 308 U.S. 473 (1940).5 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
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The Gregory case, which is undoubtedly the most cited in the entire
field of taxation, means "all things to all men." Factually, the case
presented a narrow issue. A closely held corporation, in order to avoid
an ordinary dividend to its stockholder upon the distribution of certain
appreciated securities, adopted a spin-off device. A subsidiary was
formed, the appreciated stock injected into the new corporation in ex-
change for issuance of its stock, and the stock distributed out to the
stockholder. The separate steps fit neatly and literally within the then
reorganization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, which provided
nonrecognition of gain as to the entire transaction. In words now famous
the Supreme Court held:
Putting aside ... motive ... altogether, and fixing the character
of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find?
Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose-
a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganiza-
tion as a disguise for concealing its real character ... a transfer
of a parcel of corporate shares to'the petitioner. . . . [T]he
transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the
statute. To hold otherwise would exalt artifice over reality.6
The case is codified in section 355, which surrounds the corporate spin-
offs with elaborate statutory safeguards; in particular, the five-year
active business requirement would today inhibit a Gregory transaction.
The impact of the Gregory case on the over-all complexion of the
tax law is hard to overestimate. It is, of course, most widely regarded for
its announcement of the "business purpose" requirement.
In scope, the substance doctrine runs, in one respect or another,
throughout the tax law. As it has evolved, it has developed four dis-
cernable corollaries and companion concepts.
First, those transactions which may be described as bald, bumbling,
blatant attempts to avoid tax are usually characterized as "sham."
Such categorization is more a matter of degree than the product of any
inherently identifying characteristics. "Shams" represent the crudest
types of avoidance, are found on its outer fringe, and may normally
expect summary treatment by the judiciary.
Second, the business purpose cases represent a separate strain of
substance cases. Here usually the Court is confronted, as in the Greg-
ory case, with a fact situation in which all the legal forms are present
to bring the transaction technically within certain advantageous aspects
of the Code structure. The carefully prearranged form, however, covers
and disguises the genuine underlying transaction, the essential sub-
stance of which is fundamentally different from the form. The courts
read into the Code the judicial requirement that a transaction must
have some "business purpose" in order to comply with the overriding
intention of the Code provision.
6 Note 3 supra, at 469.
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Third, many of the substance cases present considerations of econ-
omic reality. In these situations, the economic substance of the transac-
tion does not support the Code-contemplated tax treatment. The early
Supreme Court case, Higgins v. Smith,7 was among the first to break
ground in this direction. The sale by an individual to his wholly owned
corporation in order to establish a tax loss was struck down as lacking
sufficient economic reality to support a loss deduction. In the words
of the Court, "transactions, which do not vary, control or change the
flow of economic benefits, are to be dismissed from consideration." 8
The annuity-purchase interest deduction cases which culminated in the
Supreme Court's decision in Knetsch v. United States9 are more recent
examples of the requirement that some economic reality, apart from
that flowing from tax treatment, must be present to give substance to
the transaction.
The fourth corollary to the substance doctrine is that of the step
transaction, which is referred to by others as the "as if" or "net ef-
fect" doctrine. The rule, metaphorically, is that "a given result at the
end of a straight path is not made a different result because reached
by following a devious path."10 Under this concept, transactions with
several steps in form are, for purposes of analysis, telescoped and the
beginning situation compared with the end result. Where the transac-
tion, in net effect, produces a different tax result than that which would
attach to its several steps, the transaction is often treated "as if" the
net effect had directly occurred.
The outer boundary lines of the doctrine that substance prevails
over form are difficult to chart, except by the area-by-area, case-by-
case approach, which yields a pragmatic, but often jagged, line. At the
perimeter are two separate confining counterforces.
The first is the competitive doctrine that the taxpayer may arrange
his affairs in such a way as to incur the least tax, and it enjoys axiomatic
judicial acceptance. This counterdoctrine is continuously reaffirmed and
one need go no further than the Gregory opinion to find it put forth in
strong terms:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means'
which the law permits, cannot be doubted.1
The collision of these two competing doctrines on a case-by-case
basis prevents the substance doctrine from unduly encroaching on
areas in which the taxpayer's chosen form should be upheld.
The second restraining force is a self-imposed judicial limitation
7308 U.S. 473 (1940).
8 Id. at 476.
) 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
10 Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1937).
"1 Note 3 supra, at 469.
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which tends to produce a tax world of one-sided reality. The reasons
underlying this judicial reluctance may be best drawn from two pungent
judicial pronouncements: the first by the Supreme Court in Higgins v.
Smith12 and the -second by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Morris & Essex R.R. Co. :13
A taxpayer is free to adopt such organization for his affairs as he
may choose and, having elected.., he must accept the tax disad-
vantages.14
The Treasury may take a taxpayer at his word, so to say: When
that serves its purpose ... but that is a rule which works only
in the Treasury's own favor: it cannot be used to deplete the
revenue.
15
Should these flowing phrases accurately state a hard and fast rule of
law, there is little need to proceed further with this subject. But as we
shall demonstrate, the substance-over-form doctrine is not now an en-
tirely one-way street. Although it must be conceded that what is for the
Commissioner a well-paved judicially-approved highway, is for the
taxpayer often a rough and unmarked road, nevertheless, taxpayers are
increasingly finding surprising success along this road.
II. SUBSTANCE: A TAXPAYER'S ARGUMENT OF EXPANDING
IMPORTANCE
On four separate fronts, each involving a major area of taxation,
taxpayers have achieved at least moderate success in advancing the
argument that the substance, and not the form, controls. This list does
not purport to be inclusive; it seeks only to make one firm point-that
the substance argument is indeed available to taxpayers-and it may
well be that it is not made frequently enough.
A. Book Entries
First, consider book entries. It is settled law that "book entries ...
are intended to record facts, and are evidential, but . . . do not create
or destroy facts."'1 6 Although the taxpayer chooses the manner in which
the transaction is recorded and thus chooses the form it takes for ac-
counting purposes, nevertheless, from the earliest it has been recog-
nized that the taxpayer, as well as the Commissioner, may urge a con-
trary substance. In Baldwin Locomotive Works v. McCoach1 the
court sustained the taxpayer's position that, in spite of a book entry
reflecting income from an upward adjustment in asset value, in sub-
stane, no income was derived. From that day until this, it has always
been clear that the form given a transaction by the taxpayer in its
12 Note 4 supra.
13 135 F. 2d 711 (2d Cir. 1943).14 Note 4 supra, at 477.
I5 Note 13 supra, at 713.
16 Sitterding v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d 939 (4th Cir. 1936).
17 221 F. 59 (3d Cir. 1915).
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accounting records does not bind. The rule has been applied in a host
of fact settings and is now so well entrenched that, except upon re-
flection, it does not even occur to the mind that it represents a forceful
example of a situation where the Commissioner and the taxpayers stand
on equal footing when arguing for substance.
B. Corporate Entity
In the second area, corporate entity, taxpayers have done less well.
The leading case and principal taxpayer stumbling block in this area
is the Supreme Court's decision in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.1 8 There the taxpayer, purely as a security device, formed a
corporation and, after the loan which had occasioned the creation of
the corporation had been paid, the corporation sold the purchased
property at a gain. The Supreme Court, although the corporation had
no records and maintained no bank account, rejected the taxpayer's
contention that the corporate entity should be ignored and the gain
taxed to the sole stockholder:
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business
life. Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the
state law of incorporation ... or to serve the creator's personal
convenience, so long as that purpose is the equivalent of business
activity, or is followed by the carrying on of business by the
corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.
[T]he choice of advantages of incorporation . . .required
the acceptance of the tax disadvantages. 19
With the Moline Properties case on the books, it is to be expected
that taxpayers' attempts to look through corporate form would be uni-
formly unsuccessful. However, this is not strictly so. A line of cases has
developed, beginning with the decisions in Stewart Forshay20 and
Moro Realty Holding Corp.21 These cases involve so-called "dummy"
corporations-that is, corporate shells which are utilized to hold bare
legal title to real estate. The beneficial ownership resides in the stock-
holders and the corporation is otherwise passive. In these situations,
taxpayers have successfully maintained that, in substance, the income
belonged and was taxable to the stockholders and not to the corpora-
tion. In another case, Joseph Czvizler,22 an individual was allowed to
deduct net operating losses of his restaurant, although the lease cover-
ing the premises and liquor license were in the name of his corpora-
tion. It was demonstrated that, in substance, the corporation was merely
a passive record holder for convenience and that the taxpayer indi-
vidually conducted the entire business.
The multiple corporation cases are an excellent example of a situ-
18 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
19 Id. at 438.
20 20 B.T.A. 537 (1930).
2125 B.T.A. 1135 (1932).
22 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 367 (1953).
[Vol. 48
SUBSTANCE-OVER-FORM ARGUMENT
ation where the Commissioner, but probably not the taxpayer, is free
to disregard corporate entities on grounds of lack of substance. In
Alden Homes, Inc.23 sixteen separate home construction corporations
were, under the Tax Court holding, compressed into one effective tax
entity. Each of the corporations was properly formed, each owned,
legally and beneficially, the property on which it separately undertook
construction, and entirely separate financial and accounting records
were maintained by each.
Assume that in the Alden situations certain of the corporate en-
tities had suffered losses. Could the taxpayer successfully argue that,
in substance, only one taxable entity existed and thus offset losses against
gain? The taxpayer could plausibly say that "what is sauce for the
goose should also be sauce for the gander," but this, under the Moline
Properties case, is certainly not the law. It is obvious that here sub-
stance is less important than color.
Putting aside cases involving total disregard of the corporate entity
and turning to a related area of sales between stockholder and corpora-
tion, we find unencouraging disparity. A striking contrast is provided
by the Supreme Court's decision in Burnet v. Commonwealth Improve-
ment Co.24 and Higgins v. Smith.2. In the first case, the Court rejected
the taxpayer's contention that no gain should be recognized on the sale
between a corporation and its sole stockholder, since no fundamental
change in economic status attended the transaction. The Court held
that the corporation was, for legal and tax purposes, a separate entity
and that therefore the gain must be recognized. When in Higgins the
reverse situation arose-a loss on a sale-the Supreme Court stated that
"transactions, which do not vary or change the flow of economic bene-
fits, are to be dismissed from consideration. ' 26 The earlier decision in
Commonwealth Improvement was explained as follows: [A] taxpayer
is free to ... choose and having elected to do business as a corporation,
he must accept the tax disadvantages.
'2
7
The outstanding taxpayer success in the corporate entity area is
represented by the case of United States v. Kintner.2 There the tax-
payers were not seeking disregard of the corporate entity, but rather
sought corporate treatment for a medical partnership in order to
achieve a qualified pension plan. In spite of the partnership form and
despite state law prohibiting medical practice by corporations, the tax-
payers successfully pressed the argument of substance, demonstrating
that each of the essential corporate characteristics were present to
establish the corporate nature.
2333 T.C. 582 (1959).
24 287 U.S. 415 (1933).
25 Note 4 supra.
26d. at 476.
271d. at 477.
28 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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C. Unwanted Form
The third area of consideration, unwanted form, covers a variety of
seemingly unrelated cases. In each of these separate strains of cases,
taxpayers have achieved marked success with the argument that sub-
stance controls. The common thread which unites this group is the
factor that the form of the transaction was either not wanted or not
controlled by the taxpayer. Thus, the rationalization that taxpayers can-
not be heard to complain of the consequences of their choice loses
much of its force.
First, there is the situation in which a buyer wishing to acquire the
assets of a corporation is compelled by the seller to purchase the
corporate stock in order to reach the assets. The Kim ble-Dirnond MVill-
ing Company29 case landmarks this type of situation. It is a mistake,
however, to consider that case an appropriate example for our purposes,
since the Commissioner, and not the taxpayer, successfully argued
that, in substance, assets were purchased. Nevertheless, in the turn
around situations, taxpayers have almost uniformly prevailed in cases
of this type. The Tax Court recognized this in Kimble-Dimond, stating
that "without regard to whether the result is imposition or relief from
taxation, the courts have recognized that where the essential nature of
a transaction is the acquisition of property, it will be viewed as a
whole." 30
The Kimble-Dimond rule, at the corporate level, has now been
embodied into the Code-in particular, section 334(b) (1). The statu-
tory provision, once its requirements are satisfied, works automatically
regardless of the substance. The statute, although derived from a judi-
cial rule of substance, has transmitted that rule into one of form.
Section 334(b) (1) of the Code does not apply to purchases of
stock by individuals in order to reach assets. In this situation, the sub-
stance argument appears to be wide open to the taxpayer. In the case of
Estate of Suter,31 an individual, in order to reach corporate assets,
purchased the stock of a corporation, caused its liquidation, and trans-
ferred the assets to a newly formed corporation. The Tax Court held
that the intention was to purchase assets as such and not stock in a go-
ing business. The court applied the Kimble-Dimond rule to give the
new corporation a basis determined by reference to the purchase price.
An intriguing thing about the case is the fact that the new corporation
was capitalized with more than a two-to-one debt-to-equity ratio.
The second group of cases in the area of unwanted form is the fact
pattern in which, in order to expand sales or obtain supplies, the tax-
payer is required to acquire stock or securities which definitionally
29 14 T.C. 74, aff'd, 187 F. 2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951).
30 Id., 14 T.C. at 80.
3129 T.C. 244 (1957).
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are capital assets. In these so-called tie-in purchase cases, the taxpayer,
where a loss is subsequently incurred upon disposition of the capital
asset, has successfully argued that, in substance, a fully deductible
business loss was incurred. There are a host of cases supporting such
taxpayer arguments. Among the leading are Commissioner v. Bagley &
Sewall Co. 32 where a contractor was required to post U.S. Bonds to
secure performance and suffered a subsequent loss on sale of the
bonds, and Tulane Hardware Lumber Co.33 in which the lumber com-
pany, in order to obtain plywood, was required to subscribe to deben-
tures of the supplier and suffered a loss upon disposition of debentures.
The important aspect of these cases is that, in spite of the fact that the
form of the loss would require capital loss treatment, the taxpayers
have succeeded in arguing that the underlying business substance of
the transaction controls its tax incidents.
Third, are situations in which the legal instruments do not conform
to, or articulate fully, the real transaction. In such cases, the taxpayer
has advanced with considerable success the argument that substance,
not legal form, is paramount.
In business purchases, not infrequently, the instruments do not
always present true pictures of the underlying bargain and understand-
ing of the parties. The case of Wilson Athletic Goods Co. v. Com-
missioner34 presents an informative example. There, Wilson purchased
all of the assets of a Wisconsin shoe manufacturer, together with a
covenant not to compete, for a lump sum price. On its accounting
records, Wilson set up the excess of the purchase price over the book
value of the assets as consideration for a covenant not to compete,
$132,000, and good will, $10,000. Although the contract of purchase
provided no breakdown, the Seventh Circuit, in reversing the Tax
Court, stated:
The Tax Court seemed to think that, in order to justify treating
the covenant as an intangible capital asset, the contract must
have provided an express segregation of the $132,000.00 from
the total purchase price as the value of the covenant. But in tax
matters we are not bound by the strict terms of the agreement:
we must examine the circumstances to determine the actualities
and may sustain or disregard the effect of a written provision
or of an omission of a provision, if to do so best serves the
purpose of the tax statute.... [The] incident of taxation depends
upon the substance of the transaction.35
Divorce decrees can be broken, as well as marriage contracts. In
several recent cases, husbands seeking periodic payment deductions
have succeeded in going behind the captions in the divorce decree to
32221 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).
3324 T.C. 1146 (1955).
34 222 F. 2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955).
35 Id. at 357.
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demonstrate that certain amounts labelled as property settlement were,
in substance, periodic alimony payments. The Tax Court considered
such a case in Frances Marie Jacobs.36 There, after agreeing on ali-
mony payments of $800 per month, the wife's attorney, in order to
place part of the amount beyond the continuing jurisdiction of the
court, drafted the decree of divorce to incorporate as part of the prop-
erty settlement monthly payments of $500, fixing the alimony pay-
ments at $300. In that situation, it was successfully argued that, in sub-
stance, alimony of $800 was paid and deductible and that the form
of the decree should not control for tax purposes. The court looked to
the substance, allowing the full deduction.
In the Paul C. F. Vietzke case,3" the taxpayer was duped into sub-
scribing for shares in a newly formed insurance company. The state
of Indiana acted under its "blue sky" laws when an investigation re-
vealed substantial corporate milking by the incorporators. The Tax
Court, in allowing the loss as one from theft, pierced the corporate
entity and stated that "the corporate entity [was] a device to route the
subscriber's money into the [promoter's] pocket."-8 The case, of course,
represents a taxpayer's success in arguing substance-theft loss, over
form-worthless security capital loss.
D. Leaseholds
The last group of cases, leaseholds, is considered in two parts.
First, from the lessee's side and second, from the lessor's side. Some
of the results are startling demonstrations of the full potential of the
substance argument.
On the lessee's side, two situations present opportunities for the
taxpayer to urge economic substance.
One, where the lessee during the term of the lease purchases the
fee, offers fertile ground. Where the lessee in order to escape a burden-
some lease purchases the property, the purchase price, economically
speaking, contains two distinct elements of consideration: payment
to terminate the lease and the fair market value of the property. There
is no sound reason which prevents current deduction of the amount
paid to terminate a business lease, providing the amount paid is equiva-
lent to the burden. In at least one case, Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc.
v. Commissioner,39 the taxpayer has successfully argued that the pack-
age consideration should be fragmentized and that since, in substance,
part was paid to escape the burden of an unfavorable lease, such amount
was currently deductible. A related fact pattern is presented where the
lessee, having made substantial improvements on the leasehold, purchases
the property shortly before expiration of the lease. Again, in substance,
36 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 384 (1963).
3737 T.C. 504 (1961).
38 Id. at 511.
3 166 F. 2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948).
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a considerable portion of the price is attributable to the right of the
lessor to the leasehold improvements at the termination of the lease.
Again the taxpayer has been successful in sustaining the economic
substance, ascribing a significant part of the consideration to this right
and depreciating this amount over the improvement life.
The second situation on the lessee's side, where a lessee's interest in
a lease is purchased after the lessee has made improvement to the lease-
hold, presents this problem: To what extent may a portion of the lease-
hold purchase price be allocated to the improvements made by the prior
lessee and recovered over the improvement's useful life? Substantial
advantages may attend assigning part of the price to improvements.
The improvements may have a shorter life than the lease term, thus
permitting more rapid recovery of this aspect of the purchase price.
Moreover, the character of the deduction is depreciation, which permits
limited rapid depreciation methods.
This area is the scene of a notable recent taxpayer victory. In 1220
Realty Co. v. Commissioner" the taxpayer acquired the lessee's rights
under two ninety-nine year leases; the property was improved by office
buildings having a remaining useful life of twenty years. The court of
appeals, accepting the taxpayer's argument that economic substance
should prevail, stated that "where the useful life of such buildings is less
than the unexpired terms of the leases .. . there is no good reason why
the portion of the cost allocable to the buildings should not be depreciated
over their useful life." 41 The case, of course, is an excellent example
of the use by the taxpayer of the substance argument to overcome the
form, which was purchase of a lease.
Turning to the lessor's side, two relatively common commercial
transactions offer opportunities which are often overlooked. Both arise
in the situation where property is acquired subject to an existing lease.
In the first, opportunity exists where the lessee has constructed
improvements on the land. Economically, the purchaser stands in the
same position as to improvements to the land, whether they have been
placed there by the previous land owner or the tenant. The legal rights
of the new owner are the same-the right to receive the rental pay-
ments and the reversionary right to the land and improvements at the
end of the lease. Where the improvements to the land were placed
there by the seller, the purchase price is allocated between the land and
building, depreciation being permitted upon the purchased building
over its estimated life.42 Where the lessee has constructed the improve-
ments and these are to revert to the land!ord at the end of the lease,
the cases are in conflict as to whether allocation may be made and de-
preciation allowed.
40 322 F. 2d 495 (6th Cir. 1963).
41 Id. at 498.
42 Treas. Reg. §1.167(a)-5 (1963).
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The Tax Court, in a series of early cases, permitted depreciation.
It reversed this position in Albert L. Rowan.4 3 Within the last year
however, the Eighth Circuit in World Publishing Co. v. Commis-
sioner44 held that where property is purchased subject to a lease and
improvements are present, constructed by the lessee, a portion of the
price is properly allocated to the economic cost of the improvements
and depreciated over the building's useful life. Here again, a taxpayer
has succeeded in going behind the form, a property purchase, and
reaching to the underlying economic substance of the purchase tran-
saction.
The second situation which exists as an opportunity on the lessor's
side arises where property is purchased subject to a lease and the lease
has a premium value. In the market place, the presence of a lease on
the property calling for rentals in excess of the fair market value
of the property results in the lease having a "premium" value. This
economic asset has independent value and in a commercial transaction
would command separate consideration. The amount attributable to
this "premium" wastes over the life of the lease.
In the situation where property is purchased along with the seller's
interest as a lessor under a "premium" lease, an opportunity exists to
segregate the "premium" and amortize it ratably over the remaining
period of the lease. Although a conflict exists at the circuit court level,
Commissioner v. Moore45 in the Ninth Circuit permits amortization
Such a rule comports with the realistic commercial economics of the
transaction and thus with its substance.
In this over-all area of leases, both on the lessee and lessor's side,
the common problem is that of persuading the court to fragment the
consideration into its constituent economic parts and to treat each part
for tax purposes in accordance with its underlying economic substance.
It is an area in which the taxpayers have achieved considerable success
in urging substance. Nevertheless, as a word of caution, it is an area
in which preplanning aids immeasurably the task of sustaining sub-
stance. To the extent the instruments of the transaction break down
and realistically separate the constituent economic elements of the
transaction, the taxpayer is at least half way home.
In each of the four major areas which we have now covered-book
entries, corporate entity, unwanted form, and leaseholds-it has been
the purpose not to provide exhaustive or even deep treatment or analy-
sis, but rather to point up and demonstrate that, indeed, the argument
of substance over form is available to the taxpayer in a considerable
and expanding range of areas.
43 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
44 299 F. 2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
45 207 F. 2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953).
